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China’s Approach to US debt 
and the Eurozone crisis
Nicola Casarini
The sovereign debt crisis and the economic predicament of the West elicit mixed feelings and attitudes in China. On the one hand, the spiralling debt and worsening market conditions of 
the US and the eurozone are affecting China’s export-driven economy signifi cantly; on the other, 
the crisis in the West provides Beijing with the opportunity to raise its profi le internationally and 
challenge the existing international economic and monetary order. China’s fi nancial resources 
are sought after, both to contribute to solving the eurozone’s debt problem and to continue 
sustaining the America’s structural defi cit. Beijing has protected its position as the largest investor 
in US treasuries by disinvesting away from dollar-denominated assets and increasing its holdings 
of the euro. Risk in the eurozone has been offset by reallocating Chinese purchases of bonds away 
from peripheral countries and into the core members, in particular Germany. Moreover, China 
has increased its investments in European industrial and infrastructure projects that guarantee 
safer returns. The debt crisis is changing global power relations: Chinese leaders are today, for 
the fi rst time in modern history, in the position to take advantage of the West’s economic woes 
while also lecturing American and European policy makers on their economic and fi scal policies. 
CHINA AND US DEBT
Since the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 and following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008, Beijing has closely monitored the state of the US economy, China being the largest 
foreign investor of US treasury bills and other US securities. In Autumn 2010, China’s Dagong Global 
Credit Rating Company decided to downgrade the US to A+ (4 levels lower than AAA) when the US 
Federal Reserve decided to continue its policy of quantitative easing. In Chinese eyes, this is essentially a 
way for the US to print money, with the associated risks of debasing the currency and setting off infl ation 
in emerging markets. With this debt monetisation and its zero interest rate policy, the Fed is in reality 
devaluing the US dollar, making it easier for the US to service its debt. This forces foreign investors like 
China to keep rolling over debt to avoid realising currency losses on their investments. 
Since Beijing holds a signifi cant amount of US government debt it risks suffering major losses as a result 
of any dollar depreciation. These investment losses would limit the fi nancial fl exibility of China at a time 
when it is most needed for rebalancing its domestic economy and growth model. The damage could 
also lead to political instability, as the Chinese blogsphere is fi ercely critical of the central government 
and its management of China’s foreign reserves. 
Furthermore, low interest rates and the falling US dollar have encouraged investors to increase investments 
in emerging markets, which offer better returns and higher growth prospects. These fl ows have pushed 
up asset prices and currency values, distorting economic activity and leading to infl ation in China. The 
People’s Bank of China has had to intervene several times in recent years to increase interest rates and 
restrict bank lending. 
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A weaker dollar allows the US to regain its 
competitiveness by making its products cheaper. Yet 
this seems to have helped America’s exports and 
growth only partially. US debt has continued to increase 
in the last few years, raising further doubts about 
Washington’s capacity to service it in the future. These 
concerns were highlighted on 5 August 2011 when 
Standard & Poor’s downgraded the US sovereign credit 
rating by one notch from AAA to AA+. The other two 
major rating agencies, Moody’s and Fitch, maintained 
America’s AAA rating. Following Standard & Poor’s’ 
downgrade, the Chinese Dagong subsequently further 
lowered the US to a single A, indicating heightened 
doubts over Washington’s long-term ability to repay 
its debts. Dagong has also downgraded Germany, 
France and the UK, assessments not shared by the 
major Western credit rating agencies.
Standard & Poor’s justifi ed its downgrade by citing 
‘political brinkmanship’ in the US debate over the 
debt ceiling, as well as concern about the federal 
government’s ability to manage its fi nances in a stable, 
effective and predictable way. The planned $2.1 trillion 
in budget savings ‘fell short’, according to Standard 
& Poor’s, of what was required to reduce the nation’s 
debt to more manageable levels. This assessment was 
largely shared by the Chinese government, which is 
increasingly worried about the security of Chinese 
savings massively invested in US treasuries and other 
US dollar securities. 
What worries China is that recent US economic growth 
has been debt-fuelled. Since 2001, borrowing has 
contributed to around half the recorded economic 
growth in the American economy. By 2008, $4 to $5 of 
debt was required to create $1 of growth. A reduction 
in debt reduces growth, which in turn makes the level 
of borrowing more diffi cult to sustain. China, as the 
major investor in US government bonds, fi nds itself in 
the position captured by John Maynard Keynes: ‘Owe 
your banker £1000 and you are at his mercy; owe him 
£1 million and the position is reversed.’ 
A MARRIAGE OF INTEREST: FOR HOW LONG?
After the US downgrade in August 2011, the Chinese 
government issued a statement indicating its hope that 
‘the US government will earnestly adopt responsible 
policies to strengthen international market confi dence, 
and to respect and protect the interests of investors’. 
The People’s Bank of China continues to purchase US 
government debt as part of a giant global liquidity 
scheme. Chinese foreign reserves have been growing 
from dollars received from exports and investments 
that had to be exchanged into local currency. In order 
to avoid increases in the value of the renminbi that 
would affect the competitive position of Chinese 
exporters, Beijing has massively invested its reserves 
in US dollar-denominated assets, primarily US Treasury 
bonds and other high-quality securities. Until summer 
2011, China typically purchased around $1 billion of 
US Treasuries a day. In this way, China has been fuelling 
American growth by both supplying cheap goods 
and providing cheap funding to fi nance the purchase 
of these goods. It has been a mutually convenient 
alliance of interests: China has fi nanced customers 
creating demand for exports and America has received 
the money to buy Chinese goods. But following the 
worsening of the global fi nancial crisis, Chinese worries 
about the sustainability of US debt have increased, 
leading the Chinese government to diversify risk away 
from the dollar. After US downgrade in August 2011, 
the Xinhua news agency called explicitly for an end 
to American hegemony over world markets and for 
international supervision of US printing of new dollars. 
It went further to argue that China ‘has every right 
now to demand the US address its structural debt 
problems and ensure the safety of China’s dollar 
assets’, maintaining that America needs to cut ‘its 
gigantic military expenditure and bloated social welfare 
costs’ to cure its budget defi cit. 
A solution to America’s debt problem is indeed to bring 
the federal budget defi cit down, through spending 
cuts, tax increases or a mixture of both. In 2011, 
the major categories of government spending were 
defence (24 percent), social services (44 percent), 
non-defence discretionary (25 percent) and interest 
(7 percent). The US defence sector captures almost a 
quarter of the federal budget, which is largely fi nanced 
by foreign investors like China. Ironically, it is toward 
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Beijing that the US military is now turning its attention. Chinese concerns about the US debt crisis coincide 
with Washington’s worries about Chinese military modernisation which are leading the US to overhaul its 
security posture in the Asia-Pacifi c.
On 5 January 2012, President Barack Obama and Leon Panetta, US Secretary of Defense, released the new 
Strategic Guidance, maintaining that the US military ‘will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacifi c 
region’. This is in keeping with the broader ‘pivot’ toward the Asia-Pacifi c, illustrated by Barack Obama’s trip 
to the region in November 2011, as well as progress toward the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) economic 
agreement and plans to rotate US military forces through bases in Australia, moves that many Chinese 
analysts have interpreted as aimed at countering China’s growing power and infl uence. The new Strategic 
Guidance refl ects a commitment to maintain the US military’s ability to operate effectively in the region and to 
continue to act as the guarantor of Asia’s public goods and security. However, the US strategic pivot toward 
the Asia-Pacifi c makes China’s bid for regional hegemony impossible. America’s new defence posture thus 
prepares for eventual hedging activities against Beijing, should China’s assertiveness and newly-acquired 
capabilities be used to undermine US strategic interests in the area. It may only be a coincidence, but China’s 
diversifi cation of its foreign reserves, which began in earnest after the US downgrade in August 2011, has 
accelerated in recent months following the announcement of the US pivot to Asia and the issuance of the 
Pentagon’s Strategic Guidance clearly aimed at keeping Beijing in check. China’s holdings of US treasuries 
at the end of January 2012 were $1.156 trillion, or 23 percent of total US treasuries, down of more than 5 
percent from 28.2 percent in July 2011.
AWAY FROM THE DOLLAR 
According to data released in March 2012 and published in the specialised press – including The 
Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times – while overall foreign demand for dollar securities 
has remained strong, the percentage of dollar holdings in China’s foreign reserves has fallen to 
a decade-low of 54 percent in 2011 from 65 percent in 2010.  Purchases of US securities accounted for just 
15 percent of the increase in China’s foreign exchange reserves in the 12 months, down from 45 percent in 
2010 and an average of 63 percent over the past fi ve years, according to information published by the US 
Treasury and the Chinese government.
This trend runs counter the approach adopted by the other world’s major central banks. According to a poll 
by Central Banking Publications – a London-based company that specialises in reporting on central banks 
– the portion of allocated reserves held in dollars rose from 60.5 percent in the second quarter of 2011 to 
62.1 percent by the end of the year while the portion of central banks’ (excluding China) allocated reserves 
held in euros fell from 26.7 percent to 25 percent over the same period, results that are supported by IMF 
data. In the same period, however, the portion of the People’s Bank of China’s (PBOC) allocated reserves 
held in euro-denominated assets rose from around 27 percent to 33 percent. This indicates that China is 
adopting a contrarian strategy – compared to the other major central banks – to aggressively diversify its 
reserve portfolio away from the dollar. This trend confi rms Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s declarations that 
the euro is currently the prime target of China’s purchases. The numbers above are signifi cant in as much as 
Beijing has accumulated the world’s largest foreign reserves (around $3.3 trillion at the end of March 2012).
The main benefi ciary of this diversifi cation strategy has therefore been the euro, which now accounts for 
around one-third of China’s foreign reserves, up six percent from summer 2011. There has been a reallocation, 
though, of Chinese purchases of eurozone bonds, away from peripheral countries such as Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain and into the more secure core members of Germany, France, Austria and the 
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Netherlands. This is in line with the statement issued 
by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of PBOC, on 12 March 
2012, about the need for Beijing to make continued 
efforts to manage the country’s reserve assets with 
‘new ideas’ and in a more ‘effective’ manner. In other 
words, China will continue to diversify its investments 
in foreign bonds away from the US dollar and into the 
more secure (i.e. AAA-rated) eurozone’s core members, 
while keeping risk control a top priority. China seems 
to put more trust in Europe’s economy – in particular 
Germany – than in the US. This is also refl ected in 
trade patterns: EU-China bilateral trade is growing 
at a sustained pace, with Sino-German trade alone 
surpassing €100 billion in 2011.
 A strong euro benefi ts China’s export-driven economy 
by putting downward pressure on China’s currency, 
and is instrumental for lessening the predominant 
position of the dollar. Furthermore, the US pivot to the 
Asia-Pacifi c and the new defence strategic guidance 
clearly aimed at Beijing are pushing Chinese leaders 
into multiplying the diversifi cation of its economic 
and political interests – and connections – to hedge 
against an eventual US-led encirclement strategy. In 
this vein, the diversifi cation of Chinese foreign reserves 
away from the dollar and into the euro also includes 
elements of support for the EU and its integration 
process as a counterbalance to America’s primacy. 
CHINA AND THE EUROZONE’S DEBT CRISIS 
Chinese leaders have approached the eurozone’s 
sovereign debt crisis through the lens of their long-
standing support for a stronger and more united 
EU that could work alongside Beijing to counter 
American hegemony, including challenging the dollar’s 
‘exorbitant privilege’. China has supported plans for 
a European single currency since the beginning, as 
part of its desire to create an international currency 
system where the dollar would be less dominant. In 
2009, the PBOC governor explicitly called for the 
creation of a new international reserve currency. In 
the meantime, for Chinese policy makers the euro 
represents the strongest alternative to the dollar, 
with Beijing having been one of the fi rst buyers of 
the new currency, starting a process of diversifi cation 
of its reserves that continues today.
It is in this context that China has voiced concerns 
about the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis. The EU is 
China’s most important export market, and since the 
mid-2000s, China has been the EU’s biggest source 
of imports. In 2011, EU-China trade amounted to 
€428 billion, yet the economic downturn in Europe is 
seriously affecting the Chinese manufacturing sector. 
It is therefore in China’s interest to continue sustain 
the value of the euro, since by doing so, it keeps 
the value of the renminbi down, thus helping the 
competitiveness of Chinese products.
The survival of the euro is also politically crucial for 
China’s multipolar strategy. Chinese offi cials have 
intervened on a number of occasions since the 
beginning of the eurozone’s debt crisis to reassure 
markets and the Europeans that they will continue to 
buy eurozone bonds. Chinese investors, for instance, 
have continued to represent a strong proportion of 
the buyers of the Portuguese bail-out bonds being 
auctioned by the eurozone’s €440 billion rescue fund, 
and Beijing has also showed an interest in investing in 
fully guaranteed and safe (i.e. AAA-rated) eurobonds 
once they become reality. 
This continued interest in euro-denominated assets 
should not be interpreted, however, as an endorsement 
of how Europe has been handling the debt crisis in 
some eurozone countries. The primary motivations 
lie in fi nding new, safe investments into which to 
put China’s growing reserves, sustaining its most 
important export market, and diversifying risk away 
from the US dollar. Beijing has agreed in principle 
to participate in the international efforts aimed at 
solving the eurozone’s debt crisis, a promise that 
Chinese leaders reiterated in 2012, during the visit 
of Angela Merkel to China in early February, on the 
occasion of the EU-China Summit on 14 February, and 
the visit of Mario Monti to Asia at the end of March. 
Yet, no offi cial commitment has been made as to the 
amount that China is ready to make available for the 
eurozone’s rescue fund through the IMF. 
Moreover, Chinese leaders have attached some 
conditionality to their participation in any solution of 
the eurozone’s sovereign debt problems, reiterating 
its demand that the EU ‘puts its house in order’. In 
September 2011, Wen Jiabao also indicated that 
the granting to China of Market Economy Status 
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(MES) and/or lifting the EU arms embargo would be 
regarded favourably by both Chinese leaders and 
citizens and thus help support China’s bailing out of 
rich Europe. In practice, China’s contribution, rather 
than simply bailing out the eurozone, has taken the 
form of growing investments in industrial assets and 
infrastructure projects across Europe. 
Analysts at Grisons Peak Merchant Bank found that 
Chinese FDIs in the EU have soared by 297 percent 
in 2010 (compared to 2009) to reach $2.13 billion. 
Europe is proving more fertile ground for Chinese 
investments than the US: China’s total investments in 
Europe are 53 percent greater than the $1.39 billion 
that went to the US in 2010, according to the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce. However, the amounts invested 
so far come to less than 5 percent of China’s global 
overseas foreign direct investment. Chinese purchases 
in Europe are likely to expand in the future as the debt 
crisis in some eurozone members provides investors 
with lucrative opportunities. To this end, in March 
2012 the Chinese government injected $30 billion 
into the China Investment Corporation (the Chinese 
sovereign wealth fund) to be used specifi cally for 
acquiring industrial and strategic assets in Europe.
THE PROPENSITY OF THINGS
China’s economy is suffering as a result of the debt 
crisis in the US and in the eurozone. Yet Chinese 
leaders have also succeeded in turning some of the 
elements of the crisis to their advantage. China’s 
strategy of diversifying its foreign reserves away from 
the dollar and into the euro contributes to China’s 
long-term goal of lessening the dominant position 
of the dollar to create a multipolar currency system, 
in which the renminbi will also have a role to play. At 
the same time, China’s support for the eurozone and 
growing investments in Europe allow Beijing to obtain 
valuable technology, knowhow and brands, to be used 
to further the country’s economic modernisation and 
development. This differentiated approach toward 
the US and the eurozone’s debt crisis appears in 
line with the Chinese traditional concept of shi 
– to exploit the propensity of things in order to achieve 
the desired goal. ■ 
